The Senate:
Notes that Section 14(2)(b) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999 (as amended) imposes a duty on all tiers of government to ensure the security and welfare of the people, including protection of public health; a confirmed COVID-19 case has been reported in Cross River State involving a 53-year-old foreign national who entered Nigeria on 17th March 2026 via the Murtala Muhammed International Airport, Lagos, proceeded to Calabar the same day, developed symptoms on 12th April 2026, and tested positive on 16th April 2026 following PCR confirmation at the National Reference Laboratory.
Also notes that epidemiological investigation of the confirmed case indicates a timeline beyond the expected incubation period, thereby raising public health concerns of possible local transmission within the Federation. Additional suspected cases have been identified and are currently under laboratory investigation with contact tracing ongoing by relevant public health authorities.
Further notes that effective outbreak response is dependent on the continuous availability of essential commodities including Viral Transport Media (VTMs), PCR reagents, Rapid Diagnostic Test kits, and Personal Protective Equipment (PPE), which are critical to diagnosis, surveillance, and infection prevention and control. The Nigeria Centre for Disease Control and Prevention is currently constrained by delayed budgetary releases, procurement bottlenecks, and insufficient capital funding since 2025, thereby limiting its preparedness and operational response capacity.
Aware that Nigeria’s public health emergency response system operates on a federal–state cooperative framework requiring strong collaboration, financing, and operational support from both levels of government. Previous outbreaks including COVID-19, Lassa fever, and Ebola preparedness exercises have demonstrated that delays in detection, fragmented coordination, and weak response systems significantly worsen outbreak outcomes and national health security risks
Observes that gaps in national preparedness and response capacity may lead to delayed detection, weak containment, and increased risk of disease spread across States. Inadequate availability of protective equipment and essential supplies places frontline health workers at increased occupational risk and undermines health system resilience, inadequate subnational preparedness weakens Nigeria’s epidemic intelligence and response system, and persistent shortages of outbreak response commodities further likely to erode public confidence, and compromise national health security.
Concerned that current deficiencies in outbreak preparedness and response mechanisms may significantly hinder early detection and effective containment of infectious diseases, while continued exposure of frontline health workers due to inadequate protective materials may weaken the capacity of the health workforce and disrupt service delivery, and insufficient state-level investment in outbreak preparedness undermines the effectiveness of Nigeria’s decentralized health security architecture, with failure to urgently address supply chain :funding constraints likely to escalate preventable public health emergencies.
Accordingly resolves to:
- Urge the Federal Ministry of Health and Social Welfare and the Nigeria Centre for Disease Control and Prevention (NCDC) to intensify surveillance, testing, contact tracing, in line with national outbreak preparedness and response protocols;
- Urge the Federal Ministry of Finance, Budget and National Planning to expedite release of funds and consider activation of emergency financing mechanisms for outbreak response;
- Request the NCDC to submit a comprehensive report to the Senate on national preparedness status, including stock levels, laboratory capacity, surveillance gaps, and response readiness indicators;
- Encourage intensified nationwide public health risk communication to prevent misinformation, reduce public anxiety, and promote adherence to preventive and control measures.
- Call on State Governments to strengthen subnational outbreak preparedness systems through improved financing, timely procurement of essential supplies, and enhanced support for surveillance and rapid response structures.
Add Comment